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[Abstract] 
This study investigates the impact of reciprocal altruistic attitudes on individual willingness 
to participate in a climate coalition with experimental evidences. The theoretical result 
suggested that the scope of the coalition’s formation could be enlarged by the participation 
of altruists. However, we found that a kind participant in the altruism test could behave 
unkindly to others in the public good game. Considering attitudes against reciprocal 
altruism, when participants thought they were being treated badly, they were more likely to 
join a coalition because of the threat of punishment. In contrast, when participants were 
noncritical to a coalition, such altruistic attitudes were insignificant to their decisions. This 
result implies that decisions in international conventions are not self-enforced. Overall, this 
study reveals that self-interest remains the key factor influencing individual participation in 
climate coalitions. Coalition formation can also be affected by reciprocal altruistic 
preferences.  
 
Keywords: social preference, experimental design, reciprocity, altruism, international 
environmental agreements  
  
                                         
 
1 Department of Economics, the Catholic University of Korea. 43 Jibong-ro, Wonmi-gu, Bucheon-si, Gyeonggi-do, 14662, 
Korea. E-mail: yuhsuan.lin@catholic.ac.kr 
This study is supported by the Catholic University of Korea Research Fund.  
2 
1 Introduction  
Since Barrett (1994), a large amount of literature (such as (Bahn, Breton, Sbragia, & 
Zaccour, 2009; Barrett, 2001; Bratberg, Tjøtta, & Ø ines, 2005; Breton, Sbragia, & 
Zaccour, 2010; Finus & Rübbelke, 2013)) has focused on the formation of 
international environmental agreements (IEAs). The existing theoretical literature 
suggests that a large-scale IEA cannot usually exist without a policy mechanism. 
However, experimental studies (Burger & Kolstad, 2010; Kosfeld, Okada, & Riedl, 
2009; Willinger & Ziegelmeyer, 2001) suggest that high levels of cooperation do exist 
in the absence of policy interventions. Such studies have claimed that people are far 
less likely to offer a free ride and more likely to cooperate than the Nash prediction 
suggests. Therefore, social (or other-regarding) preferences have been proposed by 
recent studies (such as Charness and Rabin (2002) and Dannenberg, Löschel, 
Paolacci, Reif, and Tavoni (2015)) to address this knowledge gap.  
While social preferences have received some attention from economists, 
unidirectional social preferences have been discussed. For example, simple altruism 
proposed that people may care not only about their own well-being but also about 
the well-being of others. Such concern for others is unidirectional and does not ask 
for anything in return. Yet, psychological evidence indicates that most altruistic 
behavior is more complex (Rabin, 1993). People make decisions based on how they 
are treated by others: when they meet altruistic people, they are generous; when 
they meet unkind people, they are mean.  
The motivation underlying reciprocal behavior has been discussed. Such studies 
can be categorized into three groups depending on motivations: reciprocal fairness 
(e.g., Bolton and Ockenfels (2000); Fehr and Schmidt (1999)), reciprocal altruism 
(Levine, 1998) (Dufwenberg & Kirchsteiger, 2004), and the quest for efficiency gains 
through (Brandts & Schram, 2001). There are also overviews of these (Seinen & 
Schram, 2006). In this paper, we intend to contribute to discussions of the 
motivations underlying reciprocal altruism.  
In a previous study, Lin (2017) considered the impact of a unidirectional altruistic 
preference for the formation of a climate coalition. The study presumed that 
individual altruistic attitude is consistent in both dictator and public-good games. 
However, the design neglected bilateral social preferences. The experimental result 
showed that a player could be kind to others in a unidirectional dictator game but 
unkind in an interactive public-good game. In order to understand the cooperative 
behavior of individuals even when it is not in their interest to cooperate, a further 
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investigation is required.  
This study asks the following research questions: (1) is individual social 
preference unidirectional or mutual? (2) Is coalition formation affected by individual 
social preferences? The first question asks about the magnitudes of unidirectional 
and mutual impacts at an individual level. The second question asks about 
individual impacts at a global level.  
This study examines individual decisions to participate in an IEA that is based on 
a model of reciprocity. We investigate the role of reciprocal preferences in a climate 
negotiation. The literature has shown that a grand coalition or a majority coalition 
may be stabilized by sufficiently strong and widespread reciprocity preferences. 
However, it is questionable whether this remains realistic in practice. This study tests 
that hypothesis using the existing experimental evidence.  
This study employs Rabin (1993)’s framework of reciprocity, which considers a 
player’s own payoff, the player’s perception of others’ payoffs, and others’ 
perception of the player’s payoff. When a player concerns about others’ payoffs, 
she/he has more incentive to participate in a coalition. The coalition is therefore 
enlarged. However, given reciprocity preferences, a coalition may become smaller or 
larger than the prediction with self-interest preference due to the interactive 
perceptions of players’ payoffs. This study will support that result using both 
theoretical predictions and experimental evidence, and the findings of this study will 
contribute to practical climate negotiations. 
This study contributes to the understanding of climate coalition formation. 
Particularly, we examine how individual reciprocity preferences affect a coalition. 
We find that individuals have reciprocal altruism toward others. In other words, 
their decisions depend on how they are treated by others.  
This paper is structured as follows: section 2 describes a climate negotiation using 
the model of reciprocity. Section 3 tests the model using experimental evidence. 
Section 4 compares the theoretical and experimental results. The final section 
concludes.    
2 Model of Reciprocity  
Consider a two-player reciprocity model, following Rabin (1993), with strategy 
sets 𝑆1  and 𝑆2  for players 1 and 2. The material payoff of a player 𝜋𝑖  depends 
on the strategies chosen by both players (𝑆1 × 𝑆2 ). We use the following notation: 
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𝑎1 ∈ 𝑆1  and 𝑎2 ∈ 𝑆2  represent the strategies chosen by the two players; 𝑏1 ∈ 𝑆1  
and 𝑏2 ∈ 𝑆2  represent player 1’s belief about which strategy player 2 is choosing 
and player 2’s belief about which strategy player 1 is choosing; 𝑐1 ∈ 𝑆1  and 𝑐 ∈ 𝑆2  
represent player 1’s belief about what player 2 believes player 1’s strategy is, and 
player 2’s belief about what player 1 believes player 2’s strategy is. In practice, we 
assume that 𝑏1  and 𝑏2  are player 2’s and player 1’s decisions in the past, 
respectively; and 𝑐1  and 𝑐2  are player 1’s and player 2’s decisions in the past, 
respectively. 
We assume that each player’s subjective expected utility depends on three factors: 
(i) player 𝑖’s own interest, (ii) the other player 𝑗’s interest and (iii) the player 𝑖’s 
interest influenced by the other player 𝑗’s strategy. The first factor is a linear function 
of player 𝑖’s own payoff. The second and third factors incorporate direct kindness 
and reciprocal kindness. Direct kindness indicates player 𝑖’s kindness to player 𝑗, 
while reciprocal kindness indicates how player 𝑖 experiences player 𝑗’s kindness. 
Both kindness values are defined as follows:  
Definition 1: Player 𝑖’s kindness to player 𝑗 is given by  
𝑢𝑖
𝑎(𝑏𝑗 , 𝑎𝑖 ) ≡
𝜋𝑗 (𝑏𝑗 ,𝑎𝑖 )−𝜋𝑗
𝑒(𝑏𝑗 )
𝜋𝑗
ℎ(𝑏𝑗 )−𝜋𝑗
𝑚𝑖𝑛(𝑏𝑗 )
    (1) 
If 𝜋𝑗
ℎ(𝑏𝑗 ) − 𝜋𝑗
𝑚𝑖𝑛(𝑏𝑗 ) = 0, then 𝑢𝑖
𝑎(𝑏𝑗 , 𝑎𝑖 ) = 0. 
where 𝑎𝑖  represents the strategies chosen by player 𝑖, and 𝑏𝑗  represents player 
𝑖’s belief about which strategy player 𝑗 is choosing. Player 𝑖’s kindness depends on 
four payoffs: player 𝑗’s payoff 𝜋𝑗 ; 𝜋𝑗
ℎ(𝑏𝑗 ) is player 𝑗’s lowest payoff among points 
that are Pareto-efficient in the set of all players’ possible payoffs that player 𝑖 
believes player 𝑗 is choosing; 𝜋𝑗
𝑒(𝑏𝑗 ) is the equitable payoff and is defined as the 
average of the highest and lowest payoffs, [𝜋𝑗
ℎ(𝑏𝑗 ) + 𝜋𝑗
𝑙(𝑏𝑗 )]/2; and 𝜋𝑗
𝑚𝑖𝑛(𝑏𝑗 ) is 
the worst possible payoff for player 𝑗 in the set of all possible payoffs.  
Definition 2: Player 𝑖′𝑠 belief about how kind player 𝑗 is being to her is given by  
𝑢𝑖
𝑟(𝑏𝑗 , 𝑐𝑖 ) ≡
𝜋𝑖 (𝑐𝑖 ,𝑏𝑗 )−𝜋𝑖
𝑒(𝑐𝑖 )
𝜋𝑖
ℎ(𝑐𝑖 )−𝜋𝑖
𝑚𝑖𝑛(𝑐𝑖 )
    (2) 
If 𝜋𝑖
ℎ(𝑐𝑖 ) − 𝜋𝑖
𝑚𝑖𝑛(𝑐𝑖 ) = 0, then 𝑢𝑖
𝑟(𝑏𝑗 , 𝑐𝑖 ) = 0. 
Both straight kindness and reciprocal kindness are in the range of −1 and 1/2.  
Therefore, we assume that player 𝑖’s subjective expected utility is:  
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𝑢𝑖 = 𝑢𝑖
𝑠(𝜋𝑖 ) + 𝑢𝑖
𝑟(𝜋𝑖 , 𝜋𝑗 )[1 + 𝑢𝑖
𝑎(𝜋𝑖 , 𝜋𝑗 )]   (3) 
where the first term 𝑢𝑖
𝑠 is pure self-interest, the second term contains two parts: first 
part 𝑢𝑖
𝑟 is reciprocal altruism and the latter one 𝑢𝑖
𝑎 is straight altruism. Reciprocal 
kindness plays an important role in utility. If the player feels being treated badly, her 
overall utility would be lower than her monetary payoff. On the other hand, straight 
kindness plays the role of strength of feeling. If a player is straightly unkind, she 
cares less about others’ decisions. But if a player is straight generous, her utility 
depends on how she is treated: if she is treated kindly, her utility is higher; if she is 
treated badly, her utility is lower than the monetary payoff.  
Turning to the membership game with 𝑛  players, the players were 
simultaneously asked to decide whether to participate in a coalition. Following D'As
premont, Jacquemin, Gabszewicz, and Weymark (1983), when individuals were 
characterized by reciprocal preference, a stable coalition existed when the internal 
and external constraints were satisfied as follows: 
𝑢𝑛 (𝑛∗) > 𝑢𝑛𝑠(𝑛∗ − 1)    (4-1) 
𝑢𝑛𝑠(𝑛∗) > 𝑢𝑛 (𝑛∗ + 1)    (4-2)     
where the superior letters 𝑛 and 𝑛𝑠 denote a player’s membership status: 𝑛 means 
signatory and 𝑛𝑠 means nonsignatory, the number in the bracket is the number of 
signatories. The internal constraint (4-1) denotes that a player is happier to be a part 
of the 𝑛∗-th coalition. If that constraint is satisfied, then all signatories have no 
incentive to leave the coalition. The external constraint (4-2) indicates that a non-
signatory does not wish to participate in a coalition as the (𝑛∗ + 1)-th member. If this 
constraint is satisfied, then all of the non-signatories do not want to participate. 
When both constraints are satisfied, a coalition is stable with 𝑛∗ signatories 
3 Experimental results 
We employ the experimental results from Lin (2017). The experiment was 
conducted at the center for Experimental Economics laboratory at the University of 
York (UK) in 2013 and programmed with z-Tree ((Fischbacher, 2007)). Fifty students 
with multi-cultural and multi-disciplinary backgrounds were invited to mimic a 
climate negotiation. However, any content related to environmental issues was 
excluded from the instructions to avoid biases due to subjects’ attitudes towards the 
environment. Each subject had to complete two parts in this experiment: the first 
part examined individual altruistic attitudes, and the second part measured 
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interactive social preferences in a public good game. In order to purify the research 
goal, there was no environmentally related content in the instructions. The 
experiment took place as follows.  
Prior to the experiment, a questionnaire was circulated to gather demographic 
information, including the subject’s degree discipline, age, ethnicity, political 
orientation and level of belief in a religion. The demographic results show the 
diversity of the subjects’ backgrounds. The distribution of their levels of belief in 
religion was on a scale ranging from not religious to extremely religious. The results 
showed that 40% considered themselves atheist. Meanwhile, 6, 8, and 9 subjects 
considered themselves as atheists with mild, medium, and strong beliefs, 
respectively; and 7 considered themselves pure religionists. The average level of 2.5 
implies that the strength of the subjects’ religious beliefs ranged from mild to 
medium. The other question aimed to capture their political preferences, ranging 
from left-wing to right-wing. The distribution showed that 7 subjects identified 
themselves as left-wing; 10 as center-left; 25 as neutral; 7 as center-right and 1 as 
right-wing. To ensure data quality, the subjects had to understand the rules of the 
game as much as possible. Thus, the experimenter introduced the rules and gave the 
subjects time to read through the instructions thoroughly and to complete the 
controlled questions. At the end of each part of the experiment, four control 
questions were asked to test the subjects’ understanding of the payoff tables. A new 
part would only start if all subjects had answered all control questions correctly. 
In the altruism test, subjects were anonymously and randomly paired with each 
other to make 20 ‘keep’ or ‘give’ decisions. In each round, each subject was given 1 
token, and they decided whether to give it to their partners. On the other hand, they 
did not know their partner’s decision until the end of the session. In the 20 rounds, 
there were different monetary values for keeping and giving the token.  
Next, a public good provision game was conducted. Subjects were randomly 
assigned to groups of 5 persons for the whole session, which was conducted 
anonymously. Each subject had a payoff table for all 26 possible coalition 
combinations. Payoffs for each player were not identical. The players’ payoffs, in the 
range of £0 to £24, depended on their decisions and the combination of players in the 
coalition. They were asked to make a decision to join or not join a coalition for 4 
different treatments in 60 rounds. In contrast to the altruism test, at the end of each 
round, subjects were informed about their own payoffs, other group members’ 
decisions, and the coalition formation.  
In particular, the experiment developed treatments with a self-interested 
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dominant strategy equilibrium condition. Each player had a clear dominant strategy 
for whether to participate in a coalition. Players were divided into two groups: 
critical players, who were essential to an effective coalition, and noncritical players, 
who were able to free-ride the public good benefits. The condition implies that any 
critical country could not be replaced by the joint of noncritical players. In other 
words, critical players would participate in a coalition because they were necessary 
members, and noncritical players would not participate because of the free-riding 
advantage. The condition ensures that the formation was the only stable effective 
coalition.  
While we acknowledge this is indeed a strong condition, in order to identify the 
individual incentives to participate in the coalition, this condition offered the 
primary strength of investigating individual incentives for participating in IEAs. If 
there was more than one stable coalition, the individual decisions were difficult to 
predict. However, when there was a dominant strategy equilibrium, it provided a 
suitable environment in which to observe individual decisions when every player 
had an optimal strategy to choose.  
Tables 1A and 1B show each player’s marginal benefits in eight treatments. Five 
subjects played four treatments in 60 rounds. Their payoffs depended on the 
individual marginal benefit of the total contribution: a signatory’s payoff is the 
marginal benefit times the summation of all signatories’ marginal benefits, minus the 
participation cost; a non-signatory’s payoff is the marginal benefit times the 
summation of all signatories’ marginal benefits. The treatments were designed for 
stable coalitions of 2 to 4 critical players. As explained earlier, based on the 
assumption of self-interest, the dominant strategy equilibrium design could help to 
identify individual decisions. Critical players were essential for an effective coalition, 
while noncritical players had the incentive to free ride.  
When the subjects had strong inequality-averse attitudes, then the critical players 
might have had the incentive to break the coalition internally. On the other hand, 
noncritical players might have given up the free-riding benefit by participating in a 
coalition. In this study, we assigned each subject a particular payoff table, which 
contained all of the possible payoffs with the corresponding coalition combinations2. 
The payoff depended on the given parameters and the coalition formation. For any 
ineffective coalition, all of the subjects in the group gained nothing in return. The 
                                         
 
2 A possible coalition combination requires at least 2 players. Therefore, there were (2 − 5 − 1) = 26 
possible coalition combinations. 
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possible payoffs for the subjects ranged from £0 up to £24. 
4 Analyses with experimental evidence 
Table 2 reports the number of tokens subjects decided to give when the values of 
keeping and giving the tokens varied. As mentioned earlier, different monetary 
values were attributed to keeping and giving the tokens ( 1 and  2 respectively). 
The ratio of keeping-to-giving values ( 1/ 2) was designed from 1 to 0.05 in 20 
rounds. In this altruism test, it is perhaps unsurprising that no subject decided to 
give his/her tokens in the first round. However, when the ratio of keeping-to-giving 
values became smaller, more and more subjects would give their tokens away. In the 
final round, nearly 60% of subjects gave up the token for £0.5 to allow a stranger to 
earn £10.  
In general, an increasing trend is noticed, such that subjects become altruistic 
when the token was more valuable to receivers than to givers. This interesting point 
shows that the value to the giver is an important factor in a subject’s decision-making. 
When the value of the token to a giver was small (e.g., rounds 8, 14, and 17), subjects 
were more likely to behave altruistically by giving it up.  
In the simple altruism test, subjects did not know how they were treated by their 
partners. Therefore, only pure altruism – but no reciprocal altruism – was calculated. 
Because the decisions of both keeping and giving are Pareto-efficient solutions, the 
lowest and worst payoffs for other players were the same (i.e., not giving to the 
partner). A subject’s direct altruism level is either −0 5 (keep) or 0 5 (give). The 
decisions in 20 rounds indicate the subject’s direct altruism level. The mean value of 
all subjects’ altruism levels is (−0 21), which means that subjects were unkind to 
others in general.  
Table 3 shows the OLS estimation of pure altruism attitudes. The dependent 
variable is the individual’s average direct altruism level. Independent variables are 
the factors selected from the questionnaire, including subjects’ ages, political 
attitudes, and religious attitudes. The results show that only religious attitude is 
significant for the subject’s altruism, at a 10% level. In other words, subjects with 
stronger religious beliefs behaved more altruistically toward others.  
Turning now to coalition formation in the membership game, effective coalitions 
were formed in 387 out of 600 rounds, and the formation was usually larger than the 
self-interested equilibrium size. The actual coalition formation matched the self-
interested equilibrium in only 112 rounds. The coalitions were usually neither stable 
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nor convergent to a particular coalition. With the same treatments, the coalition 
formation varied in different groups. For example, group 6 and group 8 both took 
treatments 5 to 8. Group 6 formed profitable coalitions in 47 rounds, but group 8 
achieved effective coalitions in only 12 rounds.  
We now examine the factors that might affect individual decisions; Maximum 
Likelihood Estimation (MLE) of binary probit regressions was employed in Table 4. 
The variables include (v1) the decision made in the previous round, (v2) the year the 
subjects were born, (v3) political attitudes from left to right, (v4) religious attitudes 
from atheist to religionist, (v5) the dummy variable of being critical players, (v6) the 
marginal benefit of total contribution, (v7) the group contribution in the previous 
round and (v8) individual attitudes in the pure altruism test.  
Individuals’ direct altruism and reciprocal altruism are measured as follows. 
Considering definitions 1 and 2, we employ the decisions made in the prior round to 
indicate a player’s kindness toward other players. Hence, in equations (1) and (2), 
𝑏1  and 𝑏2  are player 2’s and player 1’s decisions in the past, respectively; and 𝑐1  
and 𝑐2  are player 1 and player 2’s decisions in the past, respectively. 
The highest and lowest Pareto-efficient payoffs are the highest and lowest payoffs 
in a possible effective coalition. For a critical player, the highest payoff is a grand 
coalition solution and the lowest Pareto-efficient payoff is the self-interested Nash 
solution. For a noncritical player, the highest payoff is a solution in which the player 
is the only nonsignatory, and the lowest Pareto-efficient payoff occurs when the 
player joins with the critical players only. In addition, the worst payoff occurs when 
no coalition is formed (everyone gets nothing). Because a player faces 4 other players 
in a group, her altruism is the average of her altruism toward other players. Similarly, 
by using the players’ historical decisions, we can determine a player’s reciprocal 
altruism. In other words, a player’s reciprocal altruism is her sense of how kind other 
players were being to her.  
A subject’s altruism attitudes were the average of her attitudes to other four 
players in the group. We obtain 2,800 samples (due to the exclusion of the first 
observation in every treatment) to show players’ altruism attitudes. A correlation 
coefficient was computed to assess the relationship between an individual’s pure and 
reciprocal altruism. There was a strong and positive correlation (0.84) between pure 
and reciprocal altruism. The mean values of direct and reciprocal altruism are 
(−0 351) and (−0 346), respectively. This means that, in general, subjects behaved 
unkindly to others and were treated badly by others. The average reciprocal altruism 
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was (−0 37) when subjects were critical players, compared to (−0 33) when they 
were noncritical players. On the other hand, the average reciprocal altruism was 
(−0 36) when subjects were critical players, compared to (−0 33) when they were 
noncritical players. Hence, we can say that subjects behaved and were treated 
unkindly in general and that such feelings were stronger when they were critical 
players.  
Both direct and reciprocal altruism are used to indicate the subject’s kindness 
preferences as the final variable (v9). Due to negative reciprocal altruism, as 
mentioned in the previous section, the subjects’ overall utilities were usually worse 
than their monetary payoffs.  
The estimation of Probit MLEs(1) covers all observations of 2800 individual 
decisions, as the observations in the first round were excluded. Amongst these 
observations, the subjects decided to join the coalition a total of 1884 times. The 
result shows that past decisions, religious attitudes, the dummy variable of being a 
critical player, marginal benefits, past group contributions, kindness in the altruism 
test, and reciprocal altruism have significant effects on the decision.  
The results imply that the subjects’ decisions mostly followed the Nash 
prediction and were consistent with their past decisions. When the subjects were 
critical players, they were more likely to join the coalition. Moreover, larger coalition 
size in the past would increase the motivation to participate. It is worth noting that 
subjects cared about not only their own payoffs but also payoffs to others. However, 
the more generous they were in the altruism test, the less likely they were to join and 
make contributions in the public goods game. This interesting result can be 
illustrated with the variable of reciprocal altruism in the public goods game: when a 
subject was treated badly, that subject would be more likely to participate in the 
coalition. In other words, participation was not self-enforced but was threatened by 
unkind punishment.  
As mentioned earlier, this experimental design set the number of critical players 
required to form an effective coalition. Studying the behavior of critical players can 
enhance our understanding of the decisions of signatories because they were 
essential to stabilizing the coalition internally. Probit MLE(2) and Probit MLE(4) 
examine the observations of first-round decisions in each treatment, whilst Probit 
MLE(3) and Probit MLE(5) examine the observations of decisions in the remaining 
rounds. In addition, the observations of critical players were shown in MLE(2) and 
MLE(3). Compared to the decisions in the first round and the remaining rounds, the 
11 
participation rates declined from 93% to 85% and from 59% to 46% for the critical 
and noncritical players, respectively. This result shows that decisions did not 
converge to the prediction of self-interest, implying that subjects become less 
cooperative after learning other players’ decisions. Due to the observation size in the 
first round, possible variables are insignificant to the decisions.  
Probit MLE(3) examines the observations of critical players. A total of 85% out of 
the 1500 observations participated in a coalition, as the design suggested. In addition, 
interestingly, pro-left-wingers are more likely to participate. The critical players’ 
decisions were consistent with their past decisions. However, if a larger coalition was 
formed in the previous round, those players were less likely to participate. If a 
subject was kind to others in the altruism test, she was less likely to participate and 
form a profitable coalition. The results seem irrational but can be illustrated by 
reciprocal altruism. The worse a subject felt about how she was treated in the prior 
round, the more likely she would be to participate. In other words, a subject’s 
decision depends more on how she has been treated in the past than on her pure 
kindness.  
It is worth noting that the participation rates in the first round were higher. 
Negative reciprocal altruism may provide an answer: because critical player were 
treated kindly when most noncritical players cooperated, they were treated unkindly 
most of the time. Therefore, their reactions to others became unkind due to 
reciprocal behavior. The more they were kind to others in the direct altruism test, the 
stronger the reciprocal effect to make them turn down a profitable coalition.   
Having discussed the critical players, the noncritical players were assessed by 
estimating Probit MLE(5). These players had the free-riding incentive; however, the 
result shows that such incentives were rejected for nearly half of the 1200 
observations. In terms of the players’ preferences, individual political and religious 
attitudes have significant effects on the willingness to participate. Pro-left noncritical 
players are likely to free ride. Compared to their results when they were critical 
players, the pro-left-wingers played strategically by punishing and cooperating. On 
the other hand, the subjects with less religious belief were more likely to cooperate 
when they were noncritical players. The effect of reciprocal altruism was 
insignificant to the decisions. Neither the players’ altruism attitudes in the altruism 
test nor their altruism attitudes in the public good game were significant to the 
decision. However, we claim that the noncritical players’ decisions mostly depend on 
the marginal benefit to the total contribution. It is intuitive that higher marginal 
benefits brought higher incentives and led to lower participation. In contrast to the 
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experimental evidence of (Burger & Kolstad, 2010), this study supports their earlier 
finding that higher marginal benefits would significantly increase the size of a 
coalition.  
5 Conclusion  
This study investigates the impact of reciprocal altruistic attitudes on individual 
willingness to participate in a climate coalition. The theoretical result suggests that 
the coalition formation could be enlarged by the participation of altruists. A 
particular experiment was designed to test the theory by indicating individual 
altruistic attitudes and individuals’ willingness to join a coalition. The design assigns 
two player roles in the game: critical and noncritical players. The critical players 
have a weakly dominant strategy of joining and are essential to a profitable coalition. 
On the other hand, the noncritical players have a weakly dominant strategy of not 
joining and are dispensable to the coalition. 
The experiment contains two parts: an altruism test and a public good game. In 
the altruism test, the result confirms the existence of altruistic preferences among 60% 
of the subjects. Altruistic attitudes are significantly correlated to religious attitudes, 
such that a stronger belief leads to a higher altruistic attitude. The incentives for 
participating in a coalition were examined by binary estimations through 3,000 
observations in the membership games. The factors used in the binary regressions 
include the historical records of decisions, dummy variables of player roles, 
individual altruistic attitudes, age, political attitude, religious attitude, the marginal 
benefits of total contributions and the former coalitional formation. 
The dominant strategy equilibrium design is one of the main characteristics used 
in this study to identify individuals’ motivations. This study provides several 
intuitive implications: subjects’ decisions were consistent and pursued higher 
monetary payoffs. Usually, when they were critical to the coalition, subjects followed 
the weakly dominant strategies of participating in a coalition. However, a kind 
subject in the altruism test behaved unkindly toward others in the public good game. 
Regarding the players’ attitudes against reciprocal altruism, when they thought they 
had been treated badly, they were more likely to participate due to the threat of 
punishment. When they became noncritical, such altruistic attitudes were 
insignificant to their decisions. This surprising result implies that decision makers 
are not self-enforcing in international conventions. However, the decision process is 
too complicated to be captured by a single preference.  
Moreover, the subjects’ preferences significantly affected their decisions. The left-
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wingers participated more if they were critical, and they participated less when they 
were noncritical. This interesting result implies that they had less motivation to give 
up the free-riding benefit by joining a coalition. Another important aspect of self-
awareness is that religionists were less likely to join a coalition, and even they were 
kind to others in the anonymous altruism test. Subjects with stronger religious 
beliefs behaved altruistically. However, this does not mean that a stronger religious 
attitude would lead to an altruistic decision in the interactive game. Particularly 
when subjects were noncritical players, a stronger religious attitude leads to a 
weaker motivation to participate.  
Finally, this study provides policy implications by showing that self-interest 
remains the key factor of individual participation in climate coalitions. It is worth 
noting that coalition formation could be affected by reciprocal altruistic preferences. 
Because the decision process becomes more complicated and strategic in the 
interactive environment, coalition formation should be examined with a 
comprehensive investigation that considers other factors, including multiple 
individual preferences. 
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Tables and Figures 
Table.1A. List of parameters of marginal benefit for players in Treatment 1-4 
Rounds Player 1 Player 2 Player 3 Player 4 Player 5 
1-15 0.675* 0.375* 0.125 0.1 0.075 
16-30 0.075 0.15* 0.25* 0.3* 0.35* 
31-45 0.4* 0.65* 0.075 0.1 0.125 
46-60 0.05 0.1 0.4* 0.35* 0.3* 
 
Table.1B. List of parameters of marginal benefit for players in Treatment 5-8 
Rounds Player 1 Player 2 Player 3 Player 4 Player 5 
1-15 0.075 0.1 0.45* 0.35* 0.25* 
16-30 0.125 0.1 0.15 0.5* 0.55* 
31-45 0.45* 0.6* 0.05 0.2 0.1 
46-60 0.45* 0.25* 0.2* 0.15* 0.05 
* means critical players  
 
Table 2. The token’s values for keeping ( 1), giving ( 2), the ratio of keeping to giving and the 
number of subjects decided to give 
Round 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
 1 £1 £10 £7.5 £5 £2.5 £7.5 £5 £0.5 £5 £2.5 
 2 £1 £10.5 £8 £5.5 £3 £10 £7.5 £1 £10.5 £5.5 
 1/ 2 1 0.95 0.94 0.91 0.83 0.75 0.67 0.5 0.48 0.46 
Number of 
Giving 
0 3 7 7 8 8 8 20 14 9 
 
Round 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 
 1 £1 £2.5 £2.5 £0.5 £1 £1 £0.5 £1 £0.5 £0.5 
 2 £2.5 £7.5 £10 £2.5 £5.5 £7.5 £5 £10.5 £7.5 £10 
 1/ 2 0.4 0.33 0.25 0.2 0.18 0.13 0.1 0.095 0.07 0.05 
Number of 
Giving 
17 15 17 23 18 18 24 21 25 29 
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Table.3. OLS Estimation for Inequality-Averse Attitudes 
Variable Estimation 
Constant term 
9 79  
(0 63) 
Age 
−0 005 
(0 63) 
Politic attitude 
−0 04 
(0 49) 
Religious attitude 
0 06* 
(0 07) 
Total Observation 50 R-squared 0.07 
* means significant at 10% level. 
 
Table.4. Probit Estimations of Probability of Joining a Coalition 
Variable 
Probit 
MLE(1) 
Probit 
MLE(2) 
Probit 
MLE(3) 
Constant term −6 72 −14 05 2 02 
(v1) Prior Decision 1 37*** 2 47*** 0 95*** 
(v2) Age 0 003 0 007 −0 00 
(v3) Politic Attitude 0 04 −0 11** 0 15*** 
(v4) Religious Attitude −0 05** −0 02 −0 10*** 
(v5) Critical player 1 06***   
(v6) Marginal Benefit −1 34***  −4 97*** 
(v7) Prior Group Contribution 0 23* −0 50** −0 30 
(v8) Pure Altruism  −0 18 ∗ −0 37** −0 02 
(v9) Group Altruism −2 35*** −3 42*** 1 11 
Total Observations 2800 1540 1260 
Observations of Joining 1884 1308 576 
LR statistic 1014.23 349.46 264.61 
Note: Each cell contains coefficient. *, **, *** are significant at 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. 
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